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BRIEFING 
ON 
THE COMMON : ~oRf JGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP) 
I. CONFERENCE AGENDA 
A review of the EU Treaty provisions concerning the CFSP (Title V) is on the Conference 
agenda laid down by the Treaty itself (Article J.10). 
II. AREAS FOR REFLECTION 
A. The Union's external action 
(a) Further consideration to be given to consistency in the Union's external action: 
pillar structure or merely specific procedures? 
(b) Look into the question of legal personality for the Union. 
(c) Determine in greater depth the CFSP's objectives and fundamental interests. 
(d) Instruments: structural options to fulfil the role of analysis, planning and 
preparation for the CFSP. Decision-making procedures: various ad hoc options. 
Implementation: role of the Presidency, of the institutions and of ad hoc bodies. 
(e) Financing: options. 
(f) Role of the European Parliament and the national parliaments; consideration of 
greater interinstitutional cooperation. 
8. Security and defence 
(a) Give further consideration to options for EU-WEU relations, in parallel with 
discussions under way in the WEU. 
(b) Look at solutions for EU decision-making procedures in security and defence 
matters: the need to reconcile respect for consensus with the Union's ability to act. 
Positive abstention? Different arrangements for solidarity in the light of internal limitations? 
(c) Look at the Union's lack of symmetry in security and defence matters. A variable 
geometry arrangement in this field? Where must flexibility stop if it is to be compatible with 
collective security and the consistency of the European design? 
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(d) Give further thought to a possible amendment of Article 223 and, in general, to 
all matters concerning a possible internal market for arms. 
Ill. POSITIONS ADOPTED BY THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS 
1. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
1.1 Bourlanges and Martin report on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union 
with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (adopted on 17 May 1995) 
(a) A more effective EU foreign policy, encompassing the common commercial 
policy, development cooperation policy, and matters falling under the common foreign and 
security policy, should be established. 
(b) Clearer-cut security and defence policies should be implemented at EU level. 
(c) The common defence policy must serve to guarantee the borders of the Union and its 
Member States (one possibility being to take over Article 5 of the WEU Treaty). 
(d) Powers should be transferred from the WEU to the Union. 
(e) Where they so wished, a limited number of Member States, acting by a qualified 
majority, should have the option of embarking on humanitarian, diplomatic, or military 
action with 'joint action' status (individual Member States would not be forced to take part, 
but nor could they prevent the majority from engaging in the action). 
(f) The Commission should play a full role in working out and framing the CFSP (not 
least by exercising a right of initiative and implementing power). 
(g) A joint Commission-Council planning and analysis unit should be set up. 
(h) A civilian European peace body should be set up to train observers, mediators, 
and disputes settlement specialists. 
(i) The CFSP should be supervised by the European Parliament and the national 
parliaments. 
fj) The European Parliament should be consulted whenever the Council adopts a 
common position or a decision on joint action. 
1.2 Matutes report on progress made in implementing the common foreign and 
security policy (adopted on 18 May 1995) 
(a) An interinstitutional agreement should be concluded on implementation of Article 
J.7 of the TEU and funding of the CFSP. 
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(b) A delegation of European Parliament observers should attend international 
conferences. 
(c) An analysis and assessment centre should be set up within the EU. 
(d) A mutual assistance clause should be inserted in the TEU. 
(e) The European Union should be equipped with appropriate resources and 
machinery to place it in a more effective position to forestall and iron out conflicts by 
peaceful means. 
(0 Declarations should be issued in only a limited number of cases, and greater use 
made instead of common positions. 
(g) The categories of decisions to be adopted by a majority (simple or double 
qualified majority) or under the unanimity rule should be set out in a list. 
(h) The Union should have its own diplomatic apparatus. 
(i) Commission delegations in third countries should be upgraded to the status of 
European Union embassies. 
G) The EU should be provided with its own means of gathering information, 
including optical reconnaissance satellites. 
1.3 Dury and Maij-Weggen report on evaluation of the work of the Reflection Group 
and definition of the political priorities of the European Parliament with a view to the IGC 
(adopted on 13 March 1996) 
The resolution states that the external role of the EU should be strengthened - particularly 
in the fields of peace-keeping and security -by means of the development of a fully 
effective common foreign and security policy, involving inter alia 
- more widespread use of qualified majority voting, 
- the establishment of a joint analysis and planning unit, to come under the authority of 
the Commission, and 
- the gradual incorporation of the WEU into the EU. 
Detailed proposals: 
(a) The external role of the EU should be strengthened by means of the 
development of an effective common foreign and security policy. 
(b) The Union should be given international legal personality. 
(c) The provisions on the various aspects of external policy, including the future 
common defence policy, should be gathered into one chapter of the TEU. 
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(d) The Union shall guarantee its territorial integrity and the security of its external 
frontier. 
(e) The EU and its Member States must act consistently and efficiently in the case 
of external developments or threats (or challenges) at the external frontiers. 
(f) The Council and Commission should be assisted by a central unit for making 
• policy studies and submitting proposals. It would be run by the Commission in close 
cooperation with the Secretary-General of the Council. It would consist of staff from the 
Commission and the Council. 
(g) Decisions relating to the CFSP should be taken by a qualified majority. Any 
Member State which is not in agreement with a common position or joint action in the 
areas covered by the CFSP should have a dispensation facility, but should not be able to 
veto the common position or joint action. 
(h) The Member of the Commission with responsibility for foreign policy should 
represent the Union in the CFSP in close cooperation with the Council Presidency. The 
Member could be appointed in accordance with the procedure applying to the President 
of the Commission. Parliament rejects, therefore, the idea that there should be a 'High 
Representative' for the CFSP. 
(i) The necessary steps should be taken to have a diplomatic representation of the 
Union established in third countries where fewer than four Member States have diplomatic 
representation. 
G) The CFSP should be financed on a Community basis. Member States which 
make use of the dispensation clause may not withdraw from Community financing. 
(k) Parliamentary monitoring of the CFSP should be the responsibility of the 
European Parliament, where appropriate in cooperation with the national parliaments (for 
example, in respect of humanitarian aid and peace-keeping). The European Parliament 
must be consulted in respect of common positions and joint actions. 
(I) Article 223 must be deleted. 
1.4 Opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy 
(draftsman: Mr Goerens) on the assessment of the work of the Reflection Group 
and the European Parliament's political priorities with a view to the IGC (adopted 
on 21 February 1996) 
(a) The common provisions of the Treaty should stipulate that the promotion of a just 
international order and of human rights and democratic principles are fundamental 
objectives of the Union's policy on external relations, security, economic affairs and 
development. 
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(b) The instruments available for achieving the objectives of the CFSP should be 
expanded by including a specific reference to preventive diplomctoy. 
(c) A preventive diplomacy capable of reducing the risks of conflict and instability in 
areas of interest to the European Union and ensuring the defence of its external frontiers 
should be developed. 
(d) With regard to the defence of the external frontiers of the Union, the Member 
States should undertake to conclude an agreement on mutual assistance and solidarity. 
(e) A European civilian peace corps, to which conscientious objectors may also be 
recruited, so as to train observers, mediators and experts in the field of conflict resolution 
should be set up. 
(f) Decision-making arrangements should be modified as follows: 
The Council should, when adopting the joint action, act by qualified 
majority, the votes of its members being weighted in accordance with Article 148(2) of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community. 
A certain number of Member States, acting by a qualified majority, should 
be able to engage in a humanitarian, diplomatic or military action, which would have the 
status of a 'joint action', with the proviso that no Member State may be obliged to take part 
in a military action if it does not so desire and, equally, that no Member State may prevent 
the majority from carrying out such an action. 
(g) The CFSP should include all questions related to the security of the European 
Union, including the framing of a common defence. 
(h) The European Parliament should be consulted on common positions and joint 
actions. 
(i) The European Parliament should be able to ask questions of the Council or make 
recommendations to it regarding the CFSP. The Council should reply to Parliament's 
recommendations in writing within a fixed deadline. 
G) The Commission should be assisted by a central analysis and planning unit. The 
central unit would establish the necessary links with the Council, the Commission and the 
General Secretariat of the Western European Union, to ensure mutual cooperation 
between these institutions. It would be headed by the Commissioner responsible for 
external relations, who would be responsible for external representation in the area of the 
CFSP. The central unit would establish the necessary links with the European Parliament. 
It would take account of the opinion of the European Parliament when the latter considers 
situations and would keep the European Parliament informed of its activities and findings. 
(k) Administrative and operational expenditure which the provisions relating to the 
common foreign and security policy entail for the institutions should be charged to the 
budget of the European Communities. 
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1.5. Resolution of the European Parliament on the Dublin European Council of 13 
and 14 December 1996. 16 January 1997 
a. The European Parliament welcomes the inclusion of an article on political 
solidarity, which should also include a clause on financial solidarity, and the 
specification of the objectives of the CFSP, particularly in respect of safeguarding 
the integrity of the Union: 
b. Notes a declaration, to be included in the Final Act, concerning a new policy 
planning and early warning capability entailing, for the first time, the involvement 
of the WEU through the presence in the unit of some of its personnel and reiterates 
its request that this unit should be managed by the Commission in close 
cooperation with the Secretary-general of the Council; 
c. Notes that the Irish Presidency's text is not such as to give the Union effective 
instruments for establishing a genuine CFSP and in particular has the serious 
weaknesses indicated below on which genuinely more detailed negotiations are 
needed: 
1. the member of the Commission responsible for the CFSP should represent the 
EU in the CFSP, in close cooperation with the Council Presidency: 
2. rejects the introduction of a new veto procedure in areas where qualified majority 
voting is already provided for: appropriate mechanisms should be set up to ensure 
that a Member State cannot unilaterally block any decision-making: recalls in this 
context the Italian document of 25 October 1996 and its general approach in 
favour of increased use of qualified majority voting in the decision-making process: 
3. the unilateral strengthening of the role of the Secretary-General of the Council 
is unacceptable: believes, however that serious thought will need to be given to the 
idea of appointing an individual with a political background to be responsible for 
the CFSP but without any kind of responsibility within the general secretariat of the 
Council (the possibility of a Commissioner appointed according to special 
procedures and responsible to the Council could be envisaged); 
4. the proposal in the German non-paper of 6 June 1996 and the Italian document 
of 25 October 1996 that Article J.8 should be amended so as to introduce qualified 
majority voting as the basic rule and that when a Member State requests unanimity 
for a decision, the request may be rejected by a qualified majority, is a positive 
step; the possibility of constructive abstention is appropriate in view of the fact 
that the other Member States will benefit from political and financial solidarity in the 
application of the decisions taken: 
5. the conflict prevention capabilities of the EU should be better defined and 
strengthened ; a policy of conflict prevention and peaceful resolution of conflicts 
should become a pillar of a common defence and security policy: 
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6. it is unacceptable for operational expenditure to be deemed to be expenditure 
necessarily resulting from the Treaty within the meaning of Article 203 of the EC 
Treaty. 
2. COMMISSION 
2.1 Report of 10 May 1995 on the operation of the TEU 
(a) Practical cooperation among the institutions should be improved. 
(b) The overlapping of the different intergovernmental committees should be 
reduced. 
(c) The avenues opened up by the different CFSP policy tools should be explored, 
and the tools defined more clearly. 
(d) Insistence on unanimity should be avoided in cases where a qualified majority 
is already admissible under the Treaty; more effective decision-making procedures should 
be employed. 
(e) The pillars should be interlinked more closely. 
(f) An interinstitutional agreement should be concluded on financing of the CFSP. 
(g) 'Second pillar' measures should be subject to judicial review. 
(h) Interaction/cooperation between the EU and the WEU should be improved, and 
the role of the WEU and its position in relation to the Union should be defined from a long-
term perspective. 
(i) Integrated multilateral forces should be set up under the responsibility of the 
WEU and/or NATO. 
G) Joint machinery should be put in place within the EU to improve the Union's 
troubleshooting capability. 
(k) The Union should be represented more prominently at the external level. 
(I) The Union should be given legal personality. 
(m) The Community and its Member States should cooperate and coordinate their 
activities more closely in areas for which they share responsibility. 
2.2 The Commission seminar of 19 November 1995. 
(a) restated its firm opposition to the appointment of a 'Mr (or Mrs) CFSP', a role 
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which would be best carried out by the 'Council Presidency/Commission duo'; 
(b) expressed support for the establishment of an 'analysis, forecasting and planning 
unit' (in which the Commission would participate and the WEU would be involved in 'an 
appropriate manner'), with the role of preparing CFSP actions (but with no right of 
initiative). 
2.3 Commission Opinion of 28 February 1996 on the IGC ('Reinforcing political union 
and preparing for enlargement') 
Three areas need to be examined with a view to strengthening the Union's ability to act 
(rather than react), which will involve: 
(a) making foreign policy more consistent ('speaking with one voice') in the political, 
economic and development spheres; since the Treaty does not ensure such consistency, 
the 'Presidency-Commission tandem' should ensure effective cooperation (from the 
preparation of decisions through to their adoption and implementation) between the two 
institutions responsible for foreign policy; 
(b) making the Community's external action more effective, by: 
adjusting the common trade policy to take account of the radical changes 
in the structure of the world economy; 
including specific provisions in the Treaty to enable the EU to speak with 
one voice in international organizations; 
coordinating Member States' policies with that of the Community in fields 
where responsibility is shared, such as development, transport and the environment; 
(c) establishing a firmer basis for the CFSP, by: 
setting up a 'joint analysis unit' composed of experts from the Member 
States and the Commission, possibly with a contribution from the WEU; 
incorporating a permanent political committee into the Council's existing 
machinery for preparing decisions; 
making qualified majority voting the general rule, with specific rules for 
decisions involving military matters or actions affecting clearly defined vital interests of a 
Member State; 
making it possible in some situations for a limited number of Member States 
to act on behalf of the Union; 
giving the Council Presidency and the Commission primary responsibility 
for the implementation of decisions; 
13 PE 166.696 
considering how to strengthen the Presidency, with support from the 
Council secretariat, which 'should not prevent certain tasks being allocated to specific 
personalities on an ad hoc basis'; 
including expenditure in this area in the Community budget; 
(d) establishing a European defence identity within NATO, by: 
making a distinction between missions aimed at restoring or keeping peace 
(which should be written into the Treaty) and territorial defence; 
reinforcing the Union's security capability by enabling Defence Ministers to 
play an appropriate role in the Council; 
deciding that security missions may be carried out on behalf of the EU by 
Member States or by 'common structures'; 
reconsidering the WEU's role, with a view to incorporating it into the EU 
according to a fixed timetable, together with its responsibility for the implementation of EU 
decisions and actions; 
strengthening the Union's industrial base in the armaments field, which will 
require greater effectiveness in the field of procurement (by means of the establishment 
of an 'agency') and a 'consistent approach' to foreign trade. 
3. COUNCIL 
3.1 Report of 1 O April 1995 on the operation of the TEU 
(a) The Council (and its Secretariat) should be given direct access to information 
concerning the CFSP and have the practical means of forming overall appreciations. 
(b) The Commission should provide a greater input in terms of substance when the 
provisions of Articles J.5(3), J.8(3), and J.9 are to be implemented. 
(c) The purpose of the different policy tools, that is to say, declarations, common positions, 
and joint action, should be clarified, and the necessary distinctions observed. 
(d) The old EPC bodies and procedures should be brought together within the single 
institutional framework provided for in the TEU with a view to decision-making. 
(e) Working parties should be merged. 
(f) More effective general coordination should be provided by the General 
Secretariat of the Council under the authority of the Presidency. 
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(g) The 'COREU' procedure should be clarified. 
(h) Better use should be made of the qualified maj1.>rity referred to in Article J.3(2) 
and (7) of the TEU. 
(i) The roles to be performed by the Presidency/Troika, on the one hand, and the 
Council's General Secretariat, on the other, in running the CFSP should be defined more 
clearly, without encroaching on the Commission's responsibilities. 
0) The Council's General Secretariat should be put to more effective use for the 
purpose of monitoring implementation of the CFSP. 
(k) More satisfactory formulas should be found with respect to common legal 
obligations vis-a-vis external parties, bearing in mind that the Union has no legal 
personality. 
(I) Appropriate funding arrangements should be laid down for the CFSP. 
(m) Relations between the Council's General Secretariat and the WEU Secretariat-
General should be made a subject of discussion. 
3.2. General outline for a draft revision of the treaties. 
DUBLIN II 
A. The CFSP: objectives, means and structures 
* The role of the European Council in defining the principles of and general and 
strategic guidelines for all areas of the CFSP would be highlighted; 
Amendment of the the Articles: 
* Rrst subparagraph of Art.J.1(1) of the TEU: 
insert .,The European Councl shall define the principles of and general and strategic guidelines for the 
common foreign and security policy.11 
* First indent of Article J. 1 (2) of the TEU: 
.,The objectives of the common foregn and security policy shall be: 
- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrit¥ of the Union in 
conformity wih the principles of the United Nations Charter'' ; 
* Article J. 1 (4) - reinforced political solidarity clause 
Add: ., The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity ... 
* the Presidency would be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council, who would 
be given new standing and visibility in foreign policy; 
Amendment of the Articles: 
* Article J.5 of the TEU: 
., 3. The Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council. 
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4. In order to ensure consistency in the external activities of the Union, the Commission shall be fully 
associated in the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 • 
5. The Council may, whenever it deems it necessary, appoint a special representative with a mandate in 
relation to particular issues." 
* Add new article J. Sb in the TEU with the content: Secretary-General of the Council to assist the Council 
in CFSP matters and to represent CFSP externally. 
* a new policy planning and early warning capability would be established under the 
Secretary-General of the Council; 
Proposal to add new Declaration to the Final Act on a new policy planning and early warning 
capability • 
* the Commission would, to ensure coherence, be associated in 
an enhanced way with CFSP policy implementation and representation 
Amendments, additions and renumbering to Articles J.1 (3) to J.3 of the present Treaty: 
* Article J.1 (3): 
... by adopting common positions in accordance with Article J. 2a; 
• by adopting joint actions in accordance with Article J. 3." 
* Add new Article on common positions J.2a into the TEU: 
.,Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall adopt a common position. 
Common position shall define tbe approach of the European Union to particular matter of a geographical 
or thematic nature Member States shall ensure that their national poUcies conform to the common 
position." 
* Article on joint actions J.3 
New paragraph J.3(2 ): 
.. Joint actions define the Union's objectives and the mnns to be put at the disposal of the Union to address 
specific sib latioos where operational action is deemed to he required in areas in which the Member States 
b8Ye important interests in common Toe following procedure shall applv far the adoption of joint actions " 
Old paragraph J.3 (2) deleted. For decision-making see new Article J. 8a. 
* diplomatic meetings with third countries would be conducted by the Presidency, 
supported by the Council Secretary-General, the Commission and if need be, by the 
incoming Presidency; 
* decision-making procedures would be improved in two ways: 
1. where unanimity would still apply, it would be possible to make declaration of 
positive abstention. A Member State which made such a declaration would not be 
obliged to apply the decision; 
2. qualified majority voting would be introduced for all decisions under the CFSP with 
the exception of the adoption of Joint Actions and all decisions with a 
military/defence dimension subject, however, to provision that no vote would be taken 
where a member of the Council declared its intention to oppose the adoption of a 
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decision for stated reasons of national policy. In such cases a qualified majority could 
ask tc/have the issue referred to the European Council (Heads of State or Gov~~rnment) 
for de..-ision by unanimity. 
Proposal to add new article on decision-making J. 8a in the TEU 
B. Security and defence 
The texts suggested would: 
* reformulate the objectives of the CFSP in the field of security and defence to take 
account of developments in this area since the Treaty on European Union was 
negotiated; 
- Proposal to amend Article on the Union's objectives in seurity and defense J. 4(1) of the TEU: 
11 1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, 
including the progressive (present wording: eventual ) framing of a common defence policy .in..Jbe 
perspective of (present wording: which might in time lead to) a common defence. 
Questions referred to io this article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and 
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, iocluding peacemaking 
- Declaration to the Final Act: 
11 The Conference notes that the reference to humanitarian tasks in Article J. 4(1) second subparagraph 
relates to the use of military means for humanitarian purposes and is without prejudice to the humanitarian 
tasks conducted by the Community under the Treaty establishing the European Community ... 
* provide for developing the relationship between the EU and the WEU including by 
fostering closer institutional relations; 
* incorporate the objectives of the Petersberg tasks in the Treaty so as to allow the 
Union to develop its action more effectively; 
* confirm that decisions and actions of the Union having military or defence 
implications would continue to be taken by unanimity: 
Amend Article J. 4(2) 
1. 11 The Union will avail itsett of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union 
which have defence implications.11 
2. ,,Wben the Union bas recarr:se ta the weu ta elaborate and implement decisions of te Union oo the tasks 
related to in Article J 4(1), all Member States of the Union shall he entitled to participate full¥ in the tasks 
in question The Counci~ in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, shall adopt the necessary practical 
arrangements. 
These arrangements shall allow all Member State contributing to the tasks in question to participate :ftrl!v 
aod equal!¥ in planning and decision-taking in the WEIi insofar as these relate to the commitment and 
deployment of that Memehr State's national contribution " 
Decisions having defence implications dealt with under this paragraph shall he taken without prejldice to 
the policies and obligations referred to in Article J 4(4) 
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IV. POSITIONS ADOPTED BY THE MEMBER STATES 
1. BELGIUM 
a. CFSP policy making 
1. The Commission, which already has a right to initiative, should use it to the full; 
2. an analysis and planning unit should be set up, with the close involvement of 
Member States and the Commission and also possibly the WEU secretariat. 
The unit could be headed by a senior official, appointed by the Council with the 
Commission's agreement. The unit could issue opinions for the Council and the 
Commission; 
3. need to improve the Member States' ability to coordinate in Brussels between 
meetings of the Political Committee by setting up a standing group, to work within 
existing structures preparing for council meetings. 
b. CFSP decision-making process 
1. Need for unanimity often paralyses the decision-making process. 
Alternative decision-making arrangements making allowance for important national 
interests should be considered: 
- a less-than-full consensus or a super-qualified majority; 
- qualified-majority decision-making for some CFSP areas to be determined; 
-qualified-majority decision-making where proposals originate from the Commission. 
2. However, no state should be obliged to take an active part in a policy that requires military 
backup. 
3. All Member States are, however, politically and financially involved in a common decision. 
c. CFSP implementation 
1. The Commission should implement joint action to be carried out on the ground or 
closely bound up with first-pillar activities; 
2. the Council and the Commission could designate special representatives to 
implement specific CFSP decisions, reporting to the Council on their assignments; 
3. the Presidency, in cooperation with an expanded CFSP secretariat, or even the 
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Commission and such special representatives, should give effect to decisions 
basically requiring repr< :. ;entations to be made, positions to be stated and diplomatic 
negotiations and politic .ti dialogue to be engaged in. 
d. Improved implementation requires that financing from the Community budget 
become the rule. 
e. The Union's external economic policy should serve as an example for other areas of 
external policy. 
f. Rather than giving the EC and the EU separate legal responsibility, a way of giving the 
Union specific powers to condude treaties could be found (for example, in the form of a Treaty 
provision giving the Union the power to conclude agreements with third parties within the 
framework of joint actions). 
2. DENMARK 
a. The IGC must above all lay the foundations for the enlargement of the EU to include the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic States, which have applied for 
membership. 
The EU has a political, economic and security-policy interest in seeing that these countries 
become part of the EU. It is important for Europe that these countires should become 
members. 
b. Cooperation on foreign policy should remain intergovernmental. 
c. The Danish Government is prepared to agree to joint actions being adopted even if one or 
two countries do not wish to participate. 
In such situations, the Danish Government will argue in favour of a separate decision being 
taken on the conditions for those countries which do not participate in a joint action. 
d. Denmark is strongly in favour of setting up an analysis and planning unit under the aegis 
of the Council of Ministers. 
e. EU Member States should have the opportunity of participating in the performance of 
humanitarian tasks, crisis management and peace-keeping efforts if they so desire. 
3. GERMANY 
a. European Council to decide principles and common guidelines for CFSP. 
b. Obligation of Member States to common action and political solidarity when 
carrying out common European actions. Obligation of Member States to refrain in that 
case from counteractions. 
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c. Political solidarity clause int , the TEU. 
Mutual consultation mechanism Jetween Member States in times of crisis. 
d.Decision-making procedures must be adjusted to make it easier to reach a decision and to 
avoid the rigidity of unanimity, possibly by: 
making a distinction between decisions in principle and implementing 
decisions; 
enshrining the principle of constructive abstention over CFSP matters in 
the Treaty; 
introducing majority voting (by a qualified majority) for implementing 
decisions. 
But also in the future, consensus based decisions of the European Council on basic 
principles, security and on defence. 
e. In decisions that have a military impact, it should not be possible for a minority of states to 
prevent the majority from engaging in common action; however, no country should be obliged 
to take part against its will. States that do not take part must contribute to the common 
financing of the actions concerned 
f. ,,Face and voice" for CFSP (MrJMrs. CFSP, responsable to the Council. 
Close cooperation between person in charge of CFSP (Mr JMrs. CFSP), Presidency and 
the Commissar in charge of external relations. 
g. Gradual integration of an operational strengthened WEU into the EU. 
As first steps: 
1. insertion of a common solidarity clause into the TEU, on a level below military 
assistance; 
2. anchoring of the ,,Petersberg tasks" into the TEU. 
h. Establishment of a permanent analysis and planning unit to put forward proposals 
and monitor the implementation of the Council's CFSP decisions, headed by Mr JMrs. 
CFSP, to comprise staff from Member States, the Commission and the EU secretariat. 
i. Increased European Parliament influence on the CFSP. 
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4. GREECE 
a. The second pillar should be brougt ! closer to the first. Gradual communitarization 
oftheCFSP. 
b. Vital interests and points of fundamental agreement should be identified in order to 
allow the Member States to take joint action. 
c. Criteria and objectives should be laid down with a view to pursuing cooperation with 
other international organizations (NATO) in sectors and geographical areas in which 
responsibility is shared. 
d. The EU should establish a multidimensional security system. 
e. The Commission should play an increased planning role. 
f. The European Council and the Commission should be given a mandate to promote 
Community CFSP measures, subject to subsequent review by the Council meeting at 
ministerial level. 
g. The unanimity rule should continue to apply when adopting guidelines for and 
decisions on joint action falling under the CFSP. 
h. Qualified majority vote for CFSP-questions that are not of vital interest to 
Member States. 
i. Increased participation by the European Parliament in the CFSP. 
j. Increased cohesion and consistency between the CFSP and external economic 
relations. 
k. Stronger Commission role in planning, implementing and monitoring joint activities. 
I. Financing of the CFSP by the Community budget, with possible monitoring of all 
CFSP expenditure by the European Parliament. 
m. Introduction of a mutual assistance clause in the Treaty, to defend the Union and its 
Member States' external frontiers. 
n. A legal status for the Union's external frontiers. 
o. Stronger links between the EU and the WEU. 
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5. SPAIN 
a. CFSP- decisionmaking 
Not using the qualified majority vote is one of the reasons for the inefficiency of the 
CFSP. 
Possible solutions: 
- unanimity with ,,positive & constructive abstentionu (demands political & financial 
solidarity) 
- superqualified majority 
- only fundamental & vital national interests to prevent adoption of decisions with 
qualified majority. 
b. Maintain central role of the Presidency in external representation & carrying-out of 
theCFSP. 
c. Strengthen coordination between Presidency & Commission. 
d. Financing of common foreign policy through Community budget. 
Necessarity to establish modalities which secure necessary funding for rapid action, 
when necessary. 
e. Financial solidarity in cases of ,,positive abstention" and ,,opting outu. 
f. Atlantic Alliance & transatlantic link fundamental for European security 
g. The consensus norm mustn't exclude the possibility that supranational European 
organisms become in the future a determinig factor in security questions 
h. Fundamental to improve the Union's capacities in the areas of conflict prevention, 
peacekeeping & humanitarian operations. 
i. Possibility for militarily non-aligned EU members to participate in humanitarian 
operations, peacekeeping and other crisis-management tasks (Petersberg tasks). 
j. Increase operational capability of WEU. 
Make NA TO installations & capabilites through CJTF disponible for WEU led 
operations 
k. Gradual integration of WEU into EU. 
I. Development of European operational capacities: 
Two possibilities: 
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1. transfer WEU-functions & -capacities to 2nd pillar 
2. CFSP to assume Petersberg tasks 
m. Analysis, foreseeing, early warning & planification cell with Council's General 
Secretariat. No right to initiative. 
6. FRANCE 
a. Enforced role and competence of the European Council in the CFSP; 
The European Council must take direct charge of security and defence questions and 
decide principles and common guidelines for CFSP. 
b. Introduction of political solidarity clause into the TEU; 
Obligation of Member States to common action and political solidarity when carrying 
out common European actions. Obligation of Member States to refrain in that case 
from counteractions. 
c. Possibility of majority decisions in the field of CFSP, especially for executive 
decisions. 
d. But also in the future consensus based decisions of the European Council on basic 
principles, on security and defence. 
e. Possibility of ,,constructive abstention" • 
f. The CFSP must remain on an intergovernmental footing, but must have an appointed 
representative. ,,Face and voice" for CFSP, responsable to the Council. 
Close cooperation between person in charge of CFSP (Mr./Mrs. CFSP), Presidency and 
the commissar in charge of external relations. 
g. Gradual integration of an operational strengthened WEU into the EU. 
As first steps: 
1. insertion of a common solidarity clause into the TEU, level below military 
assistance; 
2. anchoring of so-called ,,Petersberg tasks" into the TEU. 
h. Intergovernmental cooperation in respect of the CFSP cannot be abandoned. 
I. Following enlargement, countries wishing to proceed at a faster pace must be allowed to 
do so {'multi-speed Europe'), including in the CFSP field. 
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j. The Treaty's 'pillar' structure must be retained. 
7. IRELAND 
a. Possibility of a larger use of qualified majority voting on decisions which implement the 
foreign policies decided by consensus in the Council of Ministers. 
b. Closer military cooperation between EU members in the humanitarian, peacekeeping and 
crisis management areas, but without entering into a mutual defence commitment. 
c. Irish Government to discuss with the WEU the possibility of Ireland's participation, on a 
case-by-case basis, in Petersberg tasks (humanitarian, rescue and peace-keeping 
operations). 
d. Establishment of a central planning and analysis unit at the service of the Presidency and 
the Council. 
e.The main objective of the common defence policy must be preservation of peace in 
accordance with the principles of the UN and the OSCE. 
f. The common defence policy must be compatible with Irish disarmament and arms control 
objectives. 
g. The EU's defence policy must fit in with the general security framework in Europe, to 
prevent another division of the continent. 
h. The result of the negotiations concerning Irish involvement in a common defence policy 
must be confirmed by referendum as Ireland's policy of neutrality cannot be changed unless 
the people themselves decide otherwise. 
I. Ireland will play a constructive part in the negotiations on the common defence policy. 
8. ITALY 
a. Extemal economic relations: better coordination of the Union's action in the frame 
of the World Trade Organization and development cooperation; 
b. The need to create a permanent EU body with adequate powers for external representation 
and structures to carry out analyses, put forward proposals and to implement Council 
decisions (in the form of a secretariat appointed by the Council and perhaps confirmed by the 
European Parliament or in the form of an elected presidency with a two or three year 
mandate, appointed by the Council and approved by Parliament); 
c. personality (Council's General Secretary ) to assure visibility and coherence of the 
CFSP~ 
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d. correction of the unanimity rule; unanimity must be limited strictly to national 
interests, such as ciefence. 
e. find a consensus on the principles and contents of the Union's foreign policy, 
such a consensus would permit more supple decision-making procedures, such as: 
- constructive abstention 
• qualified majority 
in a regulated respect for the political and financial solidarity; 
f. political solidarity clause; obligation of Member States to absatin from action that 
is contrary to the interests of the Union; 
g. work on the Treaty parts that foresee a CFSP, including a common defence, and this 
in full respect of transatlantic links; 
h. in the long term absorption of the WEU into the EU; 
start with: 
1. introduction of the Petersberg tasks into the TEU 
2. progressive fusion of WEU-structures into the Union. 
i. European Parliament to examine established orientations after each meeting of the 
European Council. 
j. The Italian governement aspires a institutional structure in which: 
- the European Council is the highest instance for political impulse and the definition 
of objectifs, 
- the Council of Ministers the instance for decision-making, 
- the Secretary General the organ for planning and implementation of decisions in the 
field of foreign policy, under political control of the Council and in the frame of a 
structured coordination with the ruling presidency and the Commission. 
9. LUXEMBOURG 
a. CFSP policy making 
1. The Commission, which already has a right to initiative, should use it to the full; 
2. an analysis and planning unit should be set up, with the close involvement of 
Member States and the Commission and also possibly the WEU secretarial 
The unit could be headed by a senior official, appointed by the Council with the 
Commission's agreement. The unit could issue opinions for the Council and the 
Commission; 
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3. need to improve the Member States' ability to coordinate in Brussels between 
meetings of the Political Committee by setting up a standing group, to work within 
exisiting structures preparing for council meetings. 
b. CFSP decision-making process 
1. Need for unanimity often paralyses the decision-making process. Alternative 
decision-making arrangements making allowance for important national interests 
should be considered: 
• a less-than-full consensus or a super-qualified majority; 
- qualified-majority decision-making for some CFSP areas to be determined; 
• qualified-majority decision-making where proposals originate from the Commission. 
c. CFSP implementation 
1. The Commission should implement joint action to be carried out on the ground or 
closely bound up with first-pillar activities; 
2. the Council and the Commission could designate special representatives to 
implement specific CFSP decisions, reporting to the Council on their assignments; 
3. the Presidency, in cooperation with an expanded CFSP secretariat, or even the 
Commission and such special representatives, should give effect to decisions 
basically requiring representations to be made, positions to be stated and diplomatic 
negotiations and political dialogue to be engaged in. 
d. Improved implementation requires that financing from the Community budget 
become the rule (though the problem of accounting to the political authority and the 
budgetary authority (Parliament) still has to be resolved). 
e. Appropriate solutions must be found to remedy the fact that the Union does not have a 
legal personality. 
g. Member States should not be required to take part in activities that have military 
implications (to be carried out by the WEU) if they do not want to, although one Member State 
should not be able to prevent the others from taking part. 
h. All Member States must bear the financial costs of a military operation. 
I. A future Treaty should contain the objective of gradual integration of the WEU in the EU. 
Until then, there is a need for measures that strengthen relations between the EU and the 
WEU (such as closer association of the WEU in the work of the CFSP). 
10. AUSTRIA 
a. No contradiction is perceived to exist between the CFSP as laid down in the TEU and 
the key elements of Austrian neutrality. 
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b. Austria wishes to participate at functional European security structures. 
c. The CFSP's capacity for action must be improved. 
d. Eventual transition to a majority voting system based on the principle of 'consensus bar 
one', 'positive abstention' and 'opting out'. Unanimity should be retained for military matters. 
f. Creation of a planning unit in the Council secretariat, consisting of representatives of 
the Council secretariat, the Commission and the Member States (tasks: information and 
observation, analyses and assessment and the formulation of proposals). The unit could be 
headed by someone appointed by the Council. 
g. Preparations should be made for the next stages of framing a common defence policy 
in accordance with Article J.4 of the TEU. 
h. Gradual transition towards Community procedures on foreign policy issues. 
I. A better definition of the powers of the bodies and groups that come under the second 
pillar. 
j. The Union's powers of action in the CFSP are severely limited by its lack of a legal 
personality and the fact that it consequently cannot conclude treaties. 
k. Rejection of any structural changes concerning the office of President (a longer 
mandate or a change in the rota system). 
I. No separate secretariat for the CFSP. 
m. Development of machinery to link the second and first pillars, to ensure greater 
consistency between the Community's external relations and the CFSP. 
n. The CFSP should be financed by the Community budget, although the Council's 
special position should be protected. 
o. Parliamentary control of the CFSP in its present form, especially by the national 
parliaments. 
p. The EU should have the right to issue guidelines and instructions to the WEU 
to carry out Petersberg tasks. 
11. NETHERLANDS 
a. CFSP policy making 
1. The Commission, which already has a right to initiative, should use it to the full; 
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2. an analysis and planning unit should be set up, with the close involvement of 
Member States and the Commission and also possibly the WEU secretariat. 
The unit could be headed by a senior official, appointed by the Council with the 
Commission's agreement. The unit could issue opinions for the Council and the 
Commission; 
3. need to improve the Member States' ability to coordinate in Brussels between 
meetings of the Political Committee by setting up a standing group, to work within 
exisiting structures preparing for council meetings. 
b. CFSP decision-making process 
1. Need for unanimity often paralyses the decision-making process. Alternative 
decision-making arrangements making allowance for important national interests 
should be considered: 
- a less-than-full consensus or a super-qualified majority; 
• qualified-majority decision-making for some CFSP areas to be determined; 
- qualified-majority decision-making where proposals originate from the Commission. 
c. CFSP implementation 
1. The Commission should implement joint action to be carried out on the ground or 
closely bound up with first-pillar activities; 
2. the Council and the Commission could designate special representatives to 
implement specific CFSP decisions, reporting to the Council on their assignments; 
3. the Presidency, in cooperation with an expanded CFSP secretariat, or even the 
Commission and such special representatives, should give effect to decisions 
basically requiring representations to be made, positions to be stated and diplomatic 
negotiations and political dialogue to be engaged in. 
d. Improved implementation requires that financing from the Community budget 
become the rule. 
e In the long term the CFSP should be communitized. 
f. Financing of common actions by the Community budget. 
g. The possibility of an ad hoc coalition for common actions and their implementation, 
based on consensus on the value of such action, if not all Members want to take part. 
However, all members should help to finance such action. 
h. Gradual integration of the WEU and the EU institutionally and politically. The IGC 
should prepare the ground for full integration. 
i. Direct control of the WEU planning unit by the EU. Forces attributed to the WEU should 
be made available to the EU. 
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j. Reciprocal security guarantees as a factor in the common defence policy, although 
NATO should retain practical powers. 
k. Unanimous decisions on defence policy. 
I. Application of the European Parliament's rights and powers concerning the CFSP 
(consultation, information and financing). Increase in the role of the national parliaments and 
cooperation between them and the European Parliament. 
m. Retention of the intergovernmental framework of the CFSP for the time being (for 
reasons of political realism) while seeking solutions that link Community factors to an 
intergovernmental approach. 
12. PORTUGAL 
a. Clear-cut aims and methods should be laid down where the CFSP is concerned. 
b The CFSP must be developed gradually and pragmatically. Communitization of 
the CFSP unrealistic, CFSP of intergovernmental nature. 
c. More frequent use of the majority principle. 
d. Introduction of ,,positive abstention" (Pure and simple generalization of the rule of 
qualified majority voring for CFSP not enough; the European Council should define 
clearly certain areas, where the qualified majority vote would be applied.) 
e. Machinery to ensure greater consistency between the CFSP and external economic 
relations. 
f. Consistent common guidelines. 
g. Gradual strengthening of European defence powers and gradual development of a 
common defence policy while keeping NATO as the principal element in European defence. 
h. Retention of the principle of unanimity for defence policy while allowing for 'positive 
abstention' in decision-making by the Union's institutions. 
i. Development of the WEU as an instrument of the common defence policy and as the 
European pillar of NATO. 
j. Policy planning staff for CFSP to Council's Genral Secretariat, but without right to 
initiative 
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13. FINLAND 
(a) Maintenance of the principle of intergovernmental cooperation, the structure of pillars, 
and consensus in decisions on important matters. Use of the qualified majority principle for 
questions of implementation. 
(b) Finland does not wish to take part in military alliances. 
(c) The membership of the Central European countries and the Baltic States is of vital 
importance for the security of the EU. 
(d) Retention and better application of Title 5 of the Maastricht Treaty (especially Articles 
J.7 and J.9). 
(e) Establishment of analysis and assessment capacities within the Council secretariat. 
(g) Monitoring of the implementation of the CFSP by the national parliaments, using 
current parliamentary procedures. 
(h) The principle of financing the CFSP by the Community budget while safeguarding the 
Council's independence to take operative decisions. 
(i) Continuation of the system of rotating the presidency; rejection of the idea of a 
Secretary-General for the CFSP. 
j. Possibility for all Member States to participate in joint peacekeeping & crisis 
management operations, conducted by the WEU, on the basis of equal opportunity for 
all and full contribution by the willing. 
k. Decisions on issues having defence implications will be taken by unanimity in 
accordance with TEU / J. 4(3). 
I. Inclusion of humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping & crisis 
management (Petersberg tasks) into TEU / J. 4(1). 
m. Cooperation in military crisis management is separable from collective defence 
commitments. 
n. Development of arms cooperation and possible amendment of Article 223. 
o. Closer European cooperation in the defence field must not be detrimental to the 
security provided by NATO. 
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14. SWEDEN 
(a) Sweden will continue to pursue its policy of neutrality and will not take part in military 
alliances. 
(b) The EU's planning and analysis capability must be improved by means of a 
strengthened common structure for the preparation and monitoring of decisions, to include a 
conflict-prevention dimension. 
This structure's main task would be to establish a basis for preventive action by the EU ('early 
wamingt Given 1he intergovernmental nature of such cooperation, this task could be carried 
out mainly by the Council secretariat, with the Commission being given some scope for action. 
(c) Consideration must be given to modification of the consensus principle (for any 
question that is not of vital interest for national security) to increase the Union's powers of 
action when faced with external problems. 
(d) The IGC must lay down foundations for enlargement to indude the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, Cyprus and Malta (Sweden would like the Baltic States 
to be placed on the same footing as the Central and Eastern European countries). 
(e) The CFSP must be strengthened and made more effective. 
The CFSP instruments must cover a wide area, ranging from preventive diplomacy to peace-
keeping operations. 
(f) The idea of appointing a CFSP representative should not be rejected out of hand. 
However, such a representative should have a limited role and there should be no confusion 
between his or her responsibilities and those of other representatives in the various fields 
covered by the CFSP. The representative should only act in support of the Council or the 
Presidency, and at their behest. 
(g) Procedures for monitoring application of CFSP decisions (implemented by the 
Presidency, the Troika, the Member States, the Commission and the WEU) must be 
improved. 
(h) Possibility for all Member States to participate in joint peacekeeping & crisis 
management operations, conducted by the WEU, on the basis of equal opportunity for 
all and full contribution by the willing. 
(I) Decisions on issues having defence implications will be taken by unanimity in 
accordance with TEU / J 4(3) 
0) Inclusion of humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping & crisis 
management (Petersberg tasks) into TEU / J. 4(1) 
(k) Cooperation in military crisis management is separable from collective defence 
commitments 
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(I) The IGC must bring about doser cooperation and improved coordination between the 
EU and the\/\. U with regard to peace-keeping operations and humanitarian action. None the 
less, mutual s0curity guarantees between WEU member states must be kept separate from 
cooperation in operations to promote peace in which a country which does not belong to any 
military alliance, such as Sweden, may take part. 
15. UNITED KINGDOM 
a. The CFSP must remain on an intergovemmental footing, based on the unanimity 
principle. 
b. The operational capability of the WEU should be expanded and made consistent with 
NATO's tasks, and combined joint task forces (CJTF) should be set up. 
c. Given the 'neutrality' of some of its Member States, the EU must not take 
decisions on defence matters or on the use of military forces. 
d. The WEU should not be absorbed by the EU. 
e. The WEU should be developed on the basis of the existing Treaty in order to become 
the agency responsible for European defence cooperation, working in close collaboration with 
NATO (the tasks which could fall within the ambit of European defence cooperation would 
relate primarily to crisis management, the enforcement of sanctions or embargoes, or 
humanitarian missions, generally with the support of the UN or the OSCE). 
f. A new body, the WEU Summit', should be set up within the WEU to bring together the 
WEU member States, associated countries, and countries with observer status. (The body 
would be called upon to take decisions on any measure falling under the heading of military 
operations or European defence policy. Where appropriate, it would meet at the same time 
as the European Council in order to enable the EU and the WEU to coordinate their activities 
in the proper manner). 
g. The proposal to incorporate the second pillar into the Community pillar 
(Bourlanges/Martin report) must be rejected. 
h. National parliaments must be consulted more frequently, and must be provided with 
comprehensive documentation. 
i. The IGC must review the allocation of administrative expenditure relating to the CFSP. 
j. CFSP-Planning Cell through modest enhancing of the Council Secretarial Main 
function to prepare analyses and options papers to inform discussions of CFSP 
business at the Political Committee and the GAC. 
k. CFSP Representative of Secretary -General rank, appointed by and answerable 
to the Council. Main function to contribute to the formulation/preparation of GAC CFSP 
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business. 
V. REFLECTION GROUP 
1. Progress report of 1 September 1995 
(a) Clarification of objectives and strengthening instruments for the EU's external in 
respect of the CFSP. 
(b) The need for greater consistency in all aspects of external action (some members). 
(c) General approach that will make it possible to overcome some inconsistencies 
between the external dimension of Community policies and external policy as such (new 
members). 
(d) Dispensing with the pillar structure while retaining specific proposal, decision-making 
and implementation procedures within the Community pillar following the EMU example (some 
members). Greater cooperation between pillars while maintaining the pillar structure (other 
members). 
(e) More specific statement of the EU's fundamental interests (some members). 
(f) The Union should have an international legal personality (several members). 
(g) Creation of an analysis, forecasting, planning and proposal unit or body for the 
common foreign policy (the whole Group). 
(h) Embodiment of the CFSP 
either by locating the analysis unit within the Council secretariat, with its facilities 
strengthened and the Secretary-General raised in rank to ministerial level (some members) 
or by creating a new figure, a High Permanent Representative for CFSP, 
appointed by the European Council (this person would chair the Political Committee and 
would be in charge of the planning and analysis unit). 
(i) Associating the Commission with planning and analysis work. The unit would be a 
three-part body consisting of the Member States, the Council and Commission (majority of 
members). 
(j) Rejection of the aeation of a new institution to handle the CFSP; preference for looking 
into options within the present institutional framework (majority of members). 
(k) Greater use of qualified majority voting (some members). Consensus and the right of 
veto for the CFSP essential (other members). 
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(I) Value of exploring several ad hoc arrangements such as 'consensus bar one', 'a super-
qualified majority' or ;r•ositive ab; ·ention' to overcome the risk of deadlock. 
(m) Exploration of arrangements that maintain the central role of the Presidency in external 
representation and implementation of the CFSP (ways of giving the Presidency a higher profile 
and greater permanency - perhaps a team Presidency or an elected Presidency?). The 
alternative would be to assign implementing tasks to an ad hoc body (Mr or Ms CFSP), 
possibly the High Representative for the CFSP. 
(n) Financing of the CFSP by the Community budget (vast majority of members). Need to 
establish procedures to ensure that funds are available for rapid action. Financial solidarity 
should underlie financing arrangements (in the event of 'positive abstention' or 'opting out'). 
(o) Recognition of the principle that the role of the European Parliament cannot be the 
same in the CFSP as in Community legislation (majority of members); opposition to any 
increase in the role of the European Parliament (one member); the European Parliament 
should not be given powers not enjoyed by national parliaments (several members). 
(p) Need for a collective response to the security and defence challenges facing Europe. 
(q) Establishment of relationships of mutual stability at the new borders of the enlarged 
Union. 
(r) Recognition that the role of NATO is of vital importance in territorial defence (whole 
Group). 
(s) Recognition that it is for the WEU as the European pillar of NATO progressively to 
develop a European security and defence identity (recognition of the tasks defined in the 
Petersberg declarations). 
(t) Acceptance of the consensus rule for defence. Some flexibility should be brought to 
bear in this principle by applying the rule that no-one can be obliged to take part in military 
action by the Union, nor can anyone prevent such action by a majority group of Member 
States. States that do not take part should show solidarity with the action, both financially and 
politically. 
(u) There should be greater complementarity between the EU and the WEU: politically 
(parallel EU-WEU summits), administratively (harmonization of Presidencies and Seaetariats) 
and operationally (by strengthening the WEU's capabilities. 
(v) Recognition that a merger between the WEU and the EU is not feasible in the near 
future (some members). 
(w) Creation of a genuine European security and defence identity by progressive 
integration of the WEU into the EU with two potential aspects: territorial defence under the 
Article 5 guarantee and the new aspect of defence (Petersberg tasks) (majority of members). 
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(x) Creation of legal and political links between the EU and the WEU and a minimum set 
of operational resources enabling the WEU tQ act as the EU's military arm in the field of crisis 
management and prevention and peace-keeping (majority of members). 
(y) Proposed intermediate arrangements between autonomy and integration of the WEU, 
at least until integration is achieved through the creation of a bond subordinating the WEU to 
the EU or by amending Article J.4(2) of the Treaty or by a binding agreement whereby the 
WEU would implement EU decisions with defence implications (some members). 
(z) Inclusion in the Treaty of Petersberg task matters, leaving the question of territorial 
defence to an annexed protocol. It would thus be possible to make allowance for the special 
situation of certain Member States (some members). 
2. Report of 5 December 1995 
Conclusions adopted by a majority of countries: 
(a) The EU's external action must form a harmonious whole (merging or improved 
coordination of pillars?). 
(b) The Union must be given legal personality. 
(c) An analysis, forecasting, early warning and planning unit must be set up to prepare 
common foreign and security policy. It would be located in the Council secretariat and would 
have links with the Commission (which would have representatives in the unit) and the WEU. 
Its opinions would not be binding. 
(d) Greater use must be made of majority voting. More flexible procedures should be 
adopted to enable those who feel that joint action should be carried out on behalf of the Union 
to do so. 
(e) Consideration should be given to the appointment of a CFSP representative. 
(f) Specific funding arrangements for the CFSP should be established with a view to 
ensuring the availability of the funds necessary for rapid action when required. The CFSP 
should be financed from the Community budget. 
(g) Priority should be given to enhancing the Union's capability in the areas defined at 
Petersberg. 
(h) European decision-making in the defence field should continue to be based on 
intergovernmental procedures and consensus. 
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VI. MADRID EUROPEAN COUNCIL (15-16 December 1995) 
(a) The IGC must ensure that .ne CFSP is visible to EU citizens, representative of EU 
Member States and consistent in its continuity and globality. 
(b) An analysis and planning unit must be set up. Most Member States feel that such a unit 
should be set up within the institutional framework of the Union, that it should be answerable 
to the Council and that its staff should be recruited from the Member States, the Council 
secretariat and the Commission. 
(c) The IGC must examine how to review decision-making and financing procedures in 
order to adapt them to the nature of foreign policy. 
(d) Consideration should be given to flexible formulae which will not prevent those who feel 
it necessary to take action from doing so. 
(e) The Union must ensure that it is able to speak with one voice (High Representative for 
the CFSP; structured cooperation between the Council and the Commission?). 
VII. GROUPS OF EXPERTS 
1. Findings of the Group of Experts (Durieux Group) on the CFSP (19 December 1995) 
(a) It is necessary to determine what common military resources should be provided for 
the Union in order to underpin the CFSP (time-frame; criteria for participation). 
(b) An irreversible process should be charted, leading ultimately to collective defence (as 
defined in Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty). 
(c) A politically independent, but not exclusive, central source of proposals should be put 
in place, itself backed by central analysis and assessment machinery. 
(d) Decision-making should be reformed (use of weighted qualified majorities) on the 
understanding that the changes should not extend to the practical organization of military 
intervention. 
(e) The EU should maintain a strong, continuous, and prominent presence on the 
international political stage. 
2. Second report of the High-Level Group of Experts on the CFSP led by Mr Durieux, 
submitted on 28 February 1996 ('European foreign and security policy in the run-up to the 
year 2000: ways and means of establishing genuine credibility') 
(a) The group sets out what it believes to be the minimum reforms required 'for any 
credible common foreign and security policy', as follows: 
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• 
• 
introduction of 'the tried-and-tested elements of the Community approach into the 
second pillar, i.e. a central and politically independent right of initiative based on an on-going 
analysis of the common interest and wider use of qualified mi:jority voting'; 
establishment of 'a new structure, in the form of a tripartite central analysis and 
\ proposal capacity and a CFSP High Representative'. 
,• (b) A tripartite central analysis and proposal capacity led by a CFSP High Representative 
should be set up. 
(c) The person appointed to this new post would be selected in the same manner as the 
President of the Commission and would have a 'non-exclusive' right of initiative. The central 
analysis capacity would have dose links to the Commission and the WEU General Secretariat 
and most of its staff would be on secondment from the Member States, the Commission, the 
WEU and the Council secretariat. This would involve: 
uniting the functions of CFSP High Representative and WEU Secretary General 
in one person; 
establishing a 'functional link' with the Commission; in addition to steering the 
central analysis and proposal capacity, the High Representative would have a representative 
role in the area of the CFSP, in coordination with the Council Presidency and the Commission; 
not extending the Commission's powers since, if this were to be combined with 
qualified majority voting, 'a majority of Member States would see this as a revision' of the 
Treaty's pillar structure; 
not strengthening the Council secretariat since, 'as the servant of the Member 
States meeting within the Council', the secretariat would never be 'a sufficiently autonomous 
forum for assessing the common interest'. 
(d) Decision-making procedures must be improved. Qualified majority voting must become 
the rule, although the following special constraints must be acknowledged: 
a Member State's vital interests must be respected; 
no Member State can be obliged to deploy armed forces outside its territory 
against its will; 
the Member States with the greatest military capabilities and special political 
responsibility must see this reflected in the weighting of votes . 
(e) The Union's external action must be made more consistent by: 
attempting to harmonize the objectives resulting from the Treaty, which are 
currently excessively compartmentalized, as is the case with the CFSP or commercial, 
environment and development aid policies; 
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ranking, reviewing and organizing geographical and thematic priorities in the light 
of regular assessments from the central analysis and propot . 1 capa ;ity and the Commission's 
expertise in its spheres of competence; 
comprehensive proposals being made by the CFSP High Representative and the 
Commission to the Council, which should then decide on the whole package by qualified 
majority voting (in cases where there is a need to initiate action involving instruments from 
different pillars); 
giving the EU legal personality so that it may exercise its rights and powers on 
the international stage, and enabling it to manage packages of measures drawn from different 
pillars, particularly in crisis situations. 
3. Interim report of the Working Party on the CFSP and the future of the European Union 
(Bertelsmann Foundation in collaboration with the University of Munich and DG 1 A at the 
Commission), July 1995 
(a) Creation of a European planning unit in the form of a joint Commission and Council 
body. 
(b) Decision-making by qualified majority in areas that have no military implications. 
(c) Reform of the voting system in the Council to create a greater correlation between 
votes and population. 
(d) Increased cooperation between the Presidency and the Commission to ensure more 
effective implementation of EU decisions on the CFSP. 
(e) Replacement of the system of rotating the presidencies 
either by an elected presidency for a longer period 
or an enhanced role for the Commissioner responsible for the CFSP. The idea 
of a separate CFSP body is rejected because of the risk of confusion and lack of consistency. 
(f) Financing of the CFSP by the Community budget. 
(g) Development of an independent military capacity or an EU common defence system. 
(h) Gradual integration of the WEU in the EU (perhaps as a separate pillar at the 
beginning). 
* * * * * 
For further information concerning this note, please contact 
Mr Thomas Grunert, DG IV, Political and Institutional Affairs Division, EAS 207 
Tel: 3743 (Bru) -44-08 (Str); Fax: 4955 (Bru)- 4840 (Str). 
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